Case Study:

NASA’s asteroid detection program

In 1998, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) established the Near-Earth Object (NEO) Observations Program, which aimed to identify at least 90 percent of asteroids that were at least 1 kilometer in diameter – extinction-level asteroids. Seven years later, Congress set NASA the goal of tracking the potentially hazardous objects measuring at least 140 meters in diameter, which is the size that would devastate an entire continent. NASA is currently tracking around 40 percent of the estimated population of roughly 25,000 potential objects. NASA is also deploying capabilities to divert an object on a likely collision course with Earth. The following case study shares how policy success was achieved on this global catastrophic risk.

Policy windows: The policy window opened after a series of events in the 1980s and early 1990s. Consensus had formed around the asteroid impact that caused the extinction of the dinosaurs, made more confident by the discovery of the Chicxulub crater in 1990. In 1989, there was a near-miss with a 400 meter wide asteroid. And the Comet Shoemaker–Levy 9 collided into Jupiter in 1994, making global headlines as the first direct observation of a large hazardous object colliding with a planet in our solar system. It spurred the initial directive from Congress in 1994 for NASA to develop a plan for asteroid detection. Progress slowed for a number of years, but was reignited after high media attention in March 1998 when astronomers mistakenly alerted the public that a 1 kilometer wide asteroid, 1997 XF11, was due to pass close in 2028.

Policy champions: Policy champions were critical during this period, for either pushing or delaying policy efforts. Rep. George Brown, Chair of the House Committee on Science, Technology and Space, and his staff, kept the issue alive until Republicans regained the House of Representatives in 1995. But interest had waned by the time the ‘Near-Earth Objects Survey Working Group’, chaired by Gene Shoemaker, submitted its report to Congress in late 1995. The report itself was reportedly delayed due to Shoemaker’s other commitments. And NASA itself recommended against a survey of potential NEOs due to budgetary pressures. 

Framing and messaging: Over 1997-1998, general concerns about the readiness of an asteroid impact were heightening by a quick succession of real-world and fictional accounts: the passing of Comet Hale–Bopp in 1997; news of XF11; Asteroid, an NBC TV miniseries ​​in early 1997; Deep Impact, released in May 1998; and Armageddon, released in July 1998. These accounts communicated a sense that governments were not effectively tracking or preparing for an asteroid impact. It is unclear the influence of the two blockbuster films on the political process. But, when the House Subcommittee on Space and Aeronautics met on 21 May 1998 with a renewed direction for NASA, public attention on the issue would probably have contributed and provided political cover for acting. In 2005, when growing the program, legislators framed it as an  ‘insurance policy’ against getting taken by surprise.

Coalitions: During this period, scientists and scientific organizations played an important role in informing and recommending policy. Scientists David Morrison and Clark Chapman engaged with Congress and NASA. And lobbying from the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics resulted in relevant language included in NASA’s 1991 authorization bill. This coalition was loose and small in number, but provided legitimacy and a respected voice to a complex and scientifically dense topic.

Policy basis: By 1990, scientific consensus formed around extinction of the dinosaurs, which was understood to be caused by an object of 10 kilometer diameter. It gave impetus to the scientific research and investigation of asteroid detection and deflection in the early 1990s, including: a NASA study chaired by David Morrison, the first comprehensive modern analysis of the impact hazard; the establishment of the Space Safeguard group based at Los Alamos; and the Shoemaker Committee report to Congress. By this point, it was clear that detecting NEOs of a certain size was possible and was critical to prevention of potentially hazardous objects.

Policy design and implementation: Given the scientific understanding and expertise, the policy problem and solution were very clear. Indeed, the science of asteroid detection is not difficult, at least in comparison to other NASA programs. The cost was also not prohibitive. The Planetary Defence Program started with around $4m a year, a miniscule proportion of the $14bn budget NASA had at that time, and a minor increase from the $1.4-1.8 million a year NASA was spending on NEO search before the 1998 Congressional directive. The Planetary Defense program now sits around $100m a year, which represents less than 1 per cent of NASA’s $25bn budget for 2024.

Policy ownership, accountability and coordination: Planetary defense has clear ownership and accountability. The threat of outer space objects very clearly falls in the domain of the national space agency. The Planetary Defense Coordination Office was established at NASA in 2016 to lead these efforts, and it works with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Energy in delivering the policy under the National Near-Earth Object Preparedness Strategy and Action Plan. NASA, along with DHS, lead interagency coordination on emergency response under the Planetary Impact Emergency Response Working Group, which includes the White House and the departments of Defense, State, Commerce, Agriculture and Interior. NASA has also been able to lead and underpin international efforts. The International Asteroid Warning Network (IAWN) brings together space agencies, science institutes and observatories around the world. And NASA coordinates with other space agencies, including China, Russia and the EU, to share information and develop mitigation plans on NEOs through the Space Mission Planning Advisory Group (SMPAG), a body endorsed by the ​​United Nations General  Assembly and supported by its Office for Outer Space Affairs.

Policy longevity and evolution: Although the initial NEO program started small, it has continued to grow. Indeed, by starting small and with a relatively achievable goal, the program was set up to succeed. NASA was able to build out the capability and conduct additional research and investigation before being set with the more ambitious goal of tracking asteroids of smaller size in 2005. Other events have demonstrated the value, and remaining gaps, of the program. For example, the unexpected meteor that exploded over Chelyabinsk Oblast in Russia in 2013 led to hearings in both the House and Senate of the US congress. Since 2013, NASA has been using a repurposed space-based capability to increase the speed of detection. And the program has recently expanded from detection to deflection. NASA’s Double Asteroid Redirection Test (DART), launched in November 2021, seeks to change the motion of a non-threatening asteroid to test and measure the deflection technique.

This report is part of a series of case studies on successful policies that reduce global catastrophic risk (GCR). The purpose of these case studies is to identify how the policies were successfully enacted and implemented so that policy researchers, advocates and practitioners might be able to draw lessons for other GCR reduction efforts.